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NOTE
THE McNABB-MALLORY RULE: IS THE
BENEFIT WORTH THE BURDEN?
Stacey Weldele-Wade
I. INTRODUCTION
The McNabb-Mallory rule is a composite of the supervisory
power of the Supreme Court over the federal courts and the fed-
eral prompt arraignment requirement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule was not formulated as a
constitutional doctrine,' nor was it made a "due process" standard
for the states.2 It is an exclusionary rule of evidence which pro-
vides that any statement obtained from a defendant during a pe-
riod of '-unnecessary delay" in bringing him before a magistrate in
violation of Rule 5(a) is inadmissible at trial, irrespective of
whether it was given voluntarily.3 While the great majority of the
states have prompt arraignment statutes which are similar if not
identical to Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,'
only a handful have McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rules.6 Mon-
tana is among the handful. The vast majority of the state courts
passing on the question have rejected the McNabb-Mallory rule,
choosing instead a traditional voluntariness test of the admissibil-
ity of confessions.6
This note briefly examines the rule, its history and its purpose.
Finally, the note analyzes the law in those states which have
adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule in an effort to predict what
1. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
2. Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
3. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) provides:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any per-
son making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event
that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or local judicial
officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041.
5. Michigan, Wisconsin, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Montana.
6. A comprehensive list of state decisions rejecting the McNabb-Mallory rule may be
found in F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSlONS, 165 n.46 (2d ed.
reprint 1974).
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problems Montana courts are likely to encounter in future
litigation.
II. PROMULGATION OF THE RULE
Long before the Supreme Court decided McNabb v. United
States1 in 1943, the requirement of prompt arraignment was a well
established provision of criminal procedure.8 The statutes provided
no penalty for noncompliance, however, and for all practical pur-
poses a violation was without consequence. The McNabb decision
put "teeth" into the once impotent Rule 5(a).
During the investigation of the murder of a federal revenue
agent, federal law enforcement agents raided an illegal still in the
backwoods of Tennessee late one night. Several members of the
McNabb clan were arrested and held for several days. The agents
questioned them intermittently for prolonged periods of time and
did not take them before a United States Commissioner for ar-
raignment.9 Three of the McNabbs confessed to the murder. The
Government tried to introduce these confessions at the trial. The
defense objected, claiming a violation of the fifth amendment. The
Court ruled that the confessions were inadmissible, not because
they were involuntary but because the officers who arrested the de-
fendants had not arraigned them promptly, in violation of Rule
5(a).
The exclusionary rule embodied in McNabb provided that any
confessions secured during "unnecessary delay" in arraignment are
inadmissible in a federal court.10 The theory behind the rule is that
by refusing to admit evidence obtained as a result of illegal con-
duct, courts will "instill in . . .particular investigating officers, or
in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the
rights of an accused."" The purpose for the rule is clear: the pro-
tection of one's right to a speedy arraignment, one's right to know
the charges against him, and the right to counsel. Application of
the rule, unfortunately, has never been as precise. The ambiguous
phrase "unnecessary delay" has caused considerable consternation
7. McNabb, 318 U.S. 332.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat.
688). See also Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 595, 48 Stat. 1008; Act of August 18, 1894, ch. 301,
28 Stat. 416; Act of March 1, 1879, ch. 125, 20 Stat. 341.
9. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974).
10. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341.
11. Actually, the defendant had been promptly arraigned, but this fact did not appear
in the trial court record. On retrial of the case, the McNabbs were once again convicted, and
this conviction was upheld on appeal. See McNabb v. United States, 142 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.
1944).
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among lawyers, judges, and peace officers alike.
Not until 1957 in Mallory v. United States,1 2 did the United
States Supreme Court pass directly on the question of what is "un-
necessary delay." One afternoon in the District of Columbia a wo-
man was raped in the laundry room of an apartment house in
which she lived. The following day at about two-thirty p.m. An-
drew Mallory was arrested. He was taken to the police station and
questioned for approximately thirty minutes by a team of police
detectives. At four p.m. Mallory agreed to take a lie detector test,
but the test was not given until eight p.m. Within an hour Mallory
began to make a series of confessions. At this point the police
made a token effort to locate a judge to proceed with arraignment.
The trial court admitted the confession, and the court of appeals
upheld the decision. The Supreme Court overruled the lower
courts based on the unnecessary delay standard of Rule 5(a). The
decision clearly forbade delay used for the purpose of interroga-
tion"3 but did not define the outer limits of the term "unnecessary
delay." Thus, the federal courts continued to battle out the precise
meaning on an ad hoc basis.14 Eleven years later, after extensive
litigation and no tenable solution to the unnecessary delay di-
lemma, the federal government through Congress, abandoned the
McNabb-Mallory rule.' 5
III. STATE EXPERIENCE WITH THE McNABB-MALLORY RULE
Of the six states which claim to have adopted a McNabb-Mal-
lory rule, only four, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Mon-
tana have retained an exclusionary rule based on a test of unneces-
sary delay rather than a fifth amendment test of voluntariness.
The Michigan and Wisconsin Supreme Courts claim to have
adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule in People v. Hamilton6 and
Phillips v. State, 7 respectively, but careful scrutiny indicates a
12. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
13. Id. at 455.
14. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 155, at 338 (E. Cleary 2d ed.
1972).
15. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, §
701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1976)). United States v. Hal-
bert, 436 F.2d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 1970) held that:
it is obvious that the prime purpose of Congress in the enactment of § 3501 was to
ameliorate the effect of the decision in Mallory v. United States . . . to remove
delay alone as a cause for rejecting admission into evidence of a confession and to
make the voluntary character of the confession the real test of its admissibility.
16. People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960).
17. Phillips v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1966).
1983]
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great reliance on voluntariness criteria.' 8 Both states have adopted
the exclusionary rule based solely on delay yet refuse to apply the
rule unless the defendant can prove that there is a causal link be-
tween the delay and the confession.' 9 Requiring the accused to
show proof of the connection between the delay and his confession
seems but another way of demanding he prove his confession was
not voluntary.
Three of the four states which have adopted a per se McNabb-
Mallory exclusionary rule have addressed the intractable problem
of defining unnecessary delay by providing for a specific, arbitrary
time period in which an arraignment must take place. Montana
alone has not named a specific time frame as a standard for unnec-
essary delay. Delaware by statute2 0 and Maryland by court rule2'
have each adopted a twenty-four hour arraignment rule. In both
states the period of delay is measured from arrest to confession. In
1965, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the statute and held
that a confession obtained in excess of twenty-four hours after ar-
rest was automatically inadmissible.22 A test for reasonableness of
the delay is used for all confessions obtained within the twenty-
four hour period.23 What is meant by "reasonable" has yet to be
specifically defined but has been discussed in nearly every Mc-
Nabb-Mallory case in Delaware since Vorhauer v. State.2' In 1978,
the Maryland high court promulgated an exclusionary rule under
its supervisory power.2 5 In the same year the Maryland Court of
Appeals ruled that any confession obtained after the twenty-fourth
18. See Comment, The IIl-Advised State Court Revival of the McNabb-Mallory Rule,
72 J. CiM. & CIMINOLOGY 204, 212 (1981).
19. See People v. Skowronski, 61 Mich. App. 71, 232 N.W.2d 306 (1975); People v.
Stanley, 27 Mich. App. 90, 183 N.W.2d 460 (1970); People v. Turner, 26 Mich. App. 632, 182
N.W.2d 781 (1970); People v. Carlton, 5 Mich. App. 20, 145 N.W.2d 853 (1966); People v.
Farmer, 380 Mich. 198, 156 N.W.2d 504 (1968); People v. Ubbes, 374 Mich. 571, 132 N.W.2d
669 (1965); People v. Walker, 371 Mich. 599, 124 N.W.2d 761 (1963); Wagner v. State, 89
Wis. 2d 70, 277 N.W.2d 849 (1979); Klonawski v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 604, 229 N.W.2d 637
(1975); McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 596, 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974); Hemauer v. State, 64 Wis.
2d 62, 218 N.W.2d 342 (1974); State v. Estrada, 63 Wis. 2d 476, 217 N.W.2d 359 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d 66, 207 N.W.2d 855 (1973); State
v. Schoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966).
20. DmL. CODs ANN. tit. 11, § 1909 (1974).
21. MD. DiST. R. 723(a) (Supp. 1980).
22. Vorhauer v. State, 59 Del. 35, 47, 212 A.2d 886, 893 (1965).
23. Webster v. State, 59 Del. 54, 213 A.2d 298 (1965).
24. Fullman v. State, 389 A.2d 1292 (Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 400 A.2d 292
(Del. 1979); Poli v. State, 418 A.2d 985 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); Weekley v. State, 222 A.2d
781 (Del. Super. Ct. 1966); Parson v. State, 222 A.2d 326 (Del. Super. Ct. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 935 (1967).
25. MD. DiST. R. 723(a) (Supp. 1980).
[Vol. 44
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hour would be automatically excluded without exception." As in
Delaware, confessions obtained within the twenty-four hour period
are subject to a reasonableness test to determine the cause of de-
lay. The problem of determining the reasonableness of delay,
therefore, creates the same dilemma for judges and law enforce-
ment officials as that of the open unnecessary delay standard. Such
imprecise language places the rights of the accused in a constant
state of uncertainty. The Maryland courts have been reluctant to
apply the twenty-four hour limitation in all cases. Exceptions to
the twenty-four hour rule include those confessions used for im-
peachment purposes2" and statements made by an accused while in
custody for another offense.2 8 In an attempt to elude the twenty-
four hour limit, the Maryland courts have developed a narrow defi-
nition of arrest so as to postpone the running of the self-imposed
time limit.2 9 Thus, Maryland and Delaware have both faced diffi-
culties presented by the pre-twenty-four hour "reasonableness"
test as well as by the courts' apparent reluctance to strictly adhere
to the twenty-four hour time limit. The twenty-four hour rule has
not eliminated the problems inherent in the administration of the
rule, but it has narrowed the scope of the difficulties.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the McNabb-Mal-
lory exclusionary rule in the 1972 case of Commonwealth v.
Futch.30 By a bare majority, the court interpreted the Penn-
sylvania delay statutes1 to mean that all confessions obtained after
a period of unnecessary delay would be excluded unless it could be
shown that there was no connection between the delay and the
confession. The Pennsylvania rule is different from the rules of
Delaware and Maryland in that the period of delay is measured
from the arrest to the arraignment and not from the arrest to the
confession. Later cases undertook to define the vague term "unnec-
essary delay"32 but with little success. In 1977, in an attempt to
26. Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978).
27. Harris v. State, 42 Md. App. 248, 400 A.2d 6 (1979).
28. Chaney v. State, 42 Md. App. 563, 402 A.2d 86 (1979).
29. See Kennedy v. State, 44 Md. App. 662, 410 A.2d 1097 (1980); Davis v. State, 42
Md. App. 546, 402 A.2d 77 (1979).
30. Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).
31. PA. R. CRIM. P. 130.
32. Commonwealth v. Coley, 466 Pa. 53, 351 A.2d 617 (1976); Commonwealth v. Mc-
Dade, 461 Pa. 414, 341 A.2d 450 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Milton, 461 Pa. 535, 337 A.2d 282 (1975); Commonwealth v. Whiston, 461 Pa. 101, 334 A.2d
653 (1975); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 461 Pa. 686, 334 A.2d 588 (1975); Commonwealth
v. Davis, 460 Pa. 644, 334 A.2d 275 (1975); Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 333
A.2d 892 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barilak, 460 Pa. 449, 333 A.2d 859 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Wilson, 463 Pa. 1, 329 A.2d 881 (1974); Commonwealth v. Garnett, 458 Pa. 4, 326
1983]
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resolve the ambiguous phraseology of the statute, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Davenport"3 any confes-
sion obtained in excess of a six hour pre-arraignment delay would
be automatically excluded in the absence of "exigent circum-
stances." Unlike Delaware and Maryland, Pennsylvania has no
"reasonableness" test for delays under six hours; rather, the only
standards imposed by the court were the accepted constitutional
standards of admissibility.34
The Pennsylvania rule also raised a number of problems.
First, the rule promulgated by Davenport applied only to those in-
stances where the accused was arrested after May 16, 1977. Nu-
merous cases decided by the Pennsylvania courts" subsequent to
the Davenport case but prior to its required application mentioned
the six hour rule but chose instead to follow the unnecessary delay
and reasonable relationship criteria of Futch and its progeny.3 6
Second, Davenport included its own exception based on "exigent
circumstances." The first post-Davenport case to reach the appel-
late court, Commonwealth v. Ryles,3 7 helped to define exigent cir-
cumstances. The defendant was arraigned six hours and twenty-
five minutes after his arrest, but the court held that the confession
was admissible due to the exigent circumstances exception to the
Davenport rule.38 The exigent circumstances consisted of the tem-
A.2d 335 (1974); Commonwealth v. Blagman, 458 Pa. 431, 326 A.2d 296 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163, 327 A.2d 358 (1974); Commonwealth v. Terry, 457 Pa. 185, 321
A.2d 654 (1974); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 239 Pa.
Super. 220, 362 A.2d 402 (1976); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 237 Pa. Super. 485, 353 A.2d
462 (1975); Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 226 Pa. Super. 425, 313 A.2d 337 (1973).
33. Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977).
34. Id. at 286-87, 370 A.2d at 306.
35. Commonwealth v. Smith, 487 Pa. 626, 410 A.2d 787 (1980); Commonwealth v.
McGeachy, 487 Pa. 25, 407 A.2d 1300 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bowen, 482 Pa. 453, 393
A.2d 1194 (1978); Commonwealth v. Morton, 475 Pa. 374, 380 A.2d 769 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 414, 372 A.2d 761 (1977); Commonwealth v. Lowery, 276 Pa. Super.
569, 419 A.2d 604 (1980); Commonwealth v. Boykin, 276 Pa. Super. 56, 419 A.2d 92 (1980);
Commonwealth v. Harris, 275 Pa. Super. 361, 418 A.2d 763 (1980); Commonwealth v. Jeffer-
son, 274 Pa. Super. 140, 418 A.2d 335 (1979); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 273 Pa. Super. 184,
417 A.2d 229 (1979); Commonwealth v. Presley, 270 Pa. Super. 360, 411 A.2d 760 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Henson, 269 Pa. Super. 314, 409 A.2d 906 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Steele, 269 Pa. Super. 299, 409 A.2d 898 (1979); Commonwealth v. Allessie, 267 Pa. Super.
334, 406 A.2d 1068 (1979); Commonwealth v. Hill, 267 Pa. Super. 264, 406 A.2d 796 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa. Super. 159, 401 A.2d 1148 (1979).
36. Commonwealth v. Van Cliff, 483 Pa. 576, 397 A.2d 1173 (1979), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 964 (1979); Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Pa. 569, 319 A.2d 419 (1974); Common-
wealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241, 301 A.2d 701 (1973); Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389,
290 A.2d 417 (1972).
37. Commonwealth v. Ryles, 274 Pa. Super. 547, 418 A.2d 542 (1980).
38. Id. at 551, 418 A.2d at 543 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/7
THE McNABB-MALLORY RULE
porary unavailability of the judge who was out to dinner.
The first case to enforce the exclusionary rule was Common-
wealth v. Haggarty3 9 The court excluded the confession because
the arraignment took place six hours and forty-five minutes after
arrest. The court had difficulty defining when "arrest" took place.
Even though the defendant voluntarily accompanied the police of-
ficers, the court concluded he was not free to leave and was, there-
fore, under arrest. In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Hester voiced
his dislike for the new rule: "I would hold that the six (6) hour rule
as promulgated by Davenport (supra), should not be so rigidly ap-
plied as to prevent a valid arraignment conducted six (6) hours
and forty-five (45) minutes following the detention of appellant."' 0
The following year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court over-
ruled the superior court by determining the defendant was not
under arrest when he accompanied the police.4 1 The court held the
actual time of arrest was some three and a half to four and a half
hours later, bringing the period between arrest and arraignment
well within the six hour rule. Under the new ruling the confession
was admissible. In Commonwealth v. Bennett the Pennsylvania
Superior Court carved another exception to the rule. The court
held that confessions obtained during a delay in arraignment
which exceeds six hours can be used for impeachment purposes."2
Those confessions obtained during a pre-arraignment delay of less
than six hours have consistently been admitted into evidence.'3
The reluctance to apply the harsh Davenport rule in Penn-
sylvania indicates a general disdain for the self-imposed procedural
rule. The chief means of side-stepping the rule consist in manipu-
lating the time of arrest and expanding upon the definition of exi-
gent circumstances.
IV. MONTANA'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE MCNABB-MALLORY RULE
Montana's delay statute provides only that an arrested person
be brought before the nearest committing judge without unneces-
sary delay."4 Neither is there a time-based provision in the statute
n.7, 370 A.2d 301, 306 n.7 (1977)).
39. Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 282 Pa. Super. 369, 422 A.2d 1336 (1980).
40. Id. at 375, 422 A.2d at 1339.
41. Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 495 Pa. 615, 435 A.2d 175 (1981).
42. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 287 Pa. Super. 485, 430 A.2d 994 (1981).
43. Commonwealth v. Miller, - Pa. -, 439 A.2d 1167 (1982); Commonwealth v. Penn,
_ Pa. -, 439 A.2d 1154 (1982); Commonwealth v. Nash, - Pa. -, 436 A.2d 1014 (1981);
Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 495 Pa. 615, 435 A.2d 175 (1981); Commonwealth v. Jones, 492
Pa. 433, 424 A.2d 1268 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 492 Pa. 17, 422 A.2d 116 (1980).
44. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-901(a), -603(d)(3) (recodified at MONT. CODE ANN. §
19831
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nor did the Montana Supreme Court choose to create one in State
v. Benbo,"6 the first McNabb-Mallory case to reach the Montana
Supreme Court. In adopting the McNabb-Mallory rule the Mon-
tana court relied upon the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Futch
case. The court expressly chose not to establish a time-based pe-
riod"'6 but, rather, adopted the broad unnecessary delay and causal
connection standards of Futch.7 In so doing, the Montana court
has also adopted the inherent problems of deciding when "arrest"
occurs, what are necessary or unnecessary delays, what are exigent
circumstances, and who carries the burden of proving any one of
these elements.
Since the Benbo decision in 1977, only two reported cases even
mention the McNabb-Mallory issue. The rule was held inapplica-
ble in both State v. Lenon" and State v. Rodriguez.' In Lenon,
decided the same day as State v. Benbo, the defendant was ar-
rested around midnight on a Friday evening and was arraigned on
the following Monday morning. The court found that while the
justice of the peace was out of town there were three other judges
in the county who were never contacted. The court held the exclu-
sionary rule inapplicable in this case because:
Defendant failed to prove that his failure to be presented before a
magistrate until the Monday morning after his Friday night ar-
rest constituted "unnecessary delay," since the justice of the
peace was out of town until Monday, and there was no evidence
that there was any other judge available in the county over the
weekend.50
In Rodriguez a juvenile defendant was arrested and held for
twenty days before he was arraigned. Under the Youth Court Act,
sections 41-5-301 through 924 of the Montana Code Annotated, a
juvenile does not have to be brought immediately before a judge
for an initial appearance. The case was subsequently transferred to
district court where he was convicted of deliberate homicide. The
court held: "We will, in the future, closely scrutinize these situa-
tions. If the defendant can show prejudice or a deliberate attempt
by the prosecution to circumvent a speedy arraignment, we will not
46-7-101).
45. State v. Benbo, 174 Mont. 252, 570 P.2d 894 (1977).
46. Id. at 262, 570 P.2d at 900.
47. Id.
48. State v. Lenon, 174 Mont. 264, 570 P.2d 901 (1977).
49. State v. Rodriguez, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 280 (1981).
50. Lenon, 174 Mont. at 275-76, 570 P.2d at 908.
[Vol. 44
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hesitate to fashion an appropriate remedy. '51
V. CONCLUSION
The federal experience of defining and applying an unneces-
sary delay standard was catastrophic. Forty-four states have re-
jected outright the McNabb-Mallory rule, opting instead for a
traditional due process voluntariness test of the admissibility of
confessions. Of the six states adopting this rule, two, Michigan and
Wisconsin, have adopted the rule in name only. Maryland and Del-
aware have eliminated many of the problems inherent in the exclu-
sionary rule by limiting its scope to cases in excess of twenty-four
hours, but even then exceptions have been made.52 The twenty-
four hour limit is broad enough so that the exclusionary rule is
applied in very few cases. After finally making a definite commit-
ment to what is "unnecessary delay" in 1977,"s the Pennsylvania
courts have yet to enforce their new rule.
For whatever reason, Montana has yet to embroil itself in any
lengthy litigation as to how the McNabb-Mallory rule should be
interpreted. At present, the court has chosen to address the prob-
lem of when the rule is to be applied but not how it is to be ap-
plied. When the proper case arises, as it shall, Montana will have
occasion again to weigh the utility of the rule against its burdens.
51. Rodriguez, - Mont. at -, 628 P.2d at 284.
52. See Survey, Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 938, 988-92
(1966).
53. Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 370 A.2d 301 (1977).
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